ConverterHQ assumes every uploaded file, remote URL and callback destination is hostile. Security controls are designed around that assumption rather than around file extensions being trustworthy.
Untrusted files
Workers are non-root, resource-limited and use ephemeral temporary storage. Pure conversion workers do not need arbitrary Internet access. Timeouts and process-group termination constrain misbehaving converters, while output validation prevents a converter crash or placeholder from becoming a successful paid result.
Remote URLs
URL imports and webhook destinations are checked against private/link-local/metadata ranges, redirect destinations and DNS rebinding patterns. Re-validation occurs across redirects so an initially public URL cannot redirect into cloud metadata or a private network target.
Credentials
API keys are server secrets. Cloud connection secrets are sealed with product-controlled encryption/KMS, and OAuth integrations use revocable delegated access. Use project-scoped keys with the minimum scopes required by each workload and rotate credentials when ownership changes.
Data handling
Browser and SDK large-file uploads go directly to signed object storage rather than being proxied through the API control plane. File retention is explicit, signed URLs are short-lived, and worker-local intermediates are deleted after execution according to the documented retention model.
Security response
Keep request IDs and timestamps when reporting a suspected issue. Do not send production API secrets in tickets. Security and incident claims in this documentation should describe deployed controls only; certifications or SLAs are published only when evidence exists.